WORKING PAPERS
Healy, Paul J. and Renkun Yang, "The Walker-Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: Improving Individual Rationality Without Sacrificing Simplicity or Stability." Submitted.
- Groves-Ledyard (1977) is not IR. Walker (1981) is not stable. A hybrid is stable and reduces IR failure relative to GL, but only in expectation.
Yang, Renkun, "Regulating Firm Disclosure via Minimum Quality Standards" slides
- MQS regulates quality info provision: Firms conceal mid-low qualities to increase chance of approval and reveal high qualities to dampen competition.
- MQS regulates quality choice: Quality choice and info provision are complements/substitutes for low/high MQS.
Yang, Renkun, "Information Design in Vertically Differentiated Oligopolies" slides
- Consumers prefer anything-but-ranking.
- Planner prefers nothing-but-ranking.
- Firms often disclose too much in eqm, albeit not always full info.
Yang, Renkun, "The Termination Clause as a Sequential Screening Device" slides
- The seller can use a combination of a termination fee and a floor price to sequentially screen an early-arrived buyer.
WORKS IN PROGRESS
Dynamic Assignment with Limited Commitment (with OSub Kwon)
- The principal can rebuild commitment by garbling the agent's report. Such a garbling is not implementable by mixed strategies.
Rothchild-Stiglitz Meets Roesler-Szentes (with Kun Zhang)
- The RS approach is used to resemble the whole set of buyer-optimal info in RS (2017), prior-free optimal dist in CS (2020) and the free-learning eqm in RRS (2021).
Demand Elicitation for "Myopic" Monopolists with a Representative Consumer (with John Rehbeck)
Selling Network Information (with Jianyu Xu)
SHORT NOTES
Competing for a Chance to Compete: a Persuasion Equilibrium in Natural Oligopolies
A "matching-pennies" equilibrium is identified in a competitive persuasion model in which the winner of two entrants competes with an incumbant.
Contracting Biased Experts
Imposing IR leads to artificial comparative statics when a principal compensate a biased agent with money in a quadratic loss model.
A "matching-pennies" equilibrium is identified in a competitive persuasion model in which the winner of two entrants competes with an incumbant.
Contracting Biased Experts
Imposing IR leads to artificial comparative statics when a principal compensate a biased agent with money in a quadratic loss model.
GRANTS
NSFC for Young Scientists (72303082), 2024-26